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Abstract 
 
Prior research on citizen support for European integration does not consider how 
individuals’ evaluations of European nationalities are associated with support. This paper fills 
this gap by developing a political cohesion model based on social identity theory. I claim that the 
probability of supporting integration increases with greater levels of trust in fellow Europeans, 
which assumes to reflect their positive images. Also, trust in northern EU nationalities improves 
the probability for support, more so than trust in the southern nationalities due to the latters’ 
lower economic development. Controlling for various factors, the ordered logistic regression 
analysis of five Eurobarometer surveys data from 1980-1994 among the first 12 EU members 
support these claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association Eleventh Biennial Conference, April 
23-25, 2009, Marina Del Rey, California.   1
Early thoughts regarding European integration promoted an idealism of uniting a people by 
establishing a community of Europeans. However, this goal is more pragmatic than idealistic in 
facilitating positive-sum transactions. This paper demonstrates, both theoretically and 
empirically, the connection between the level of cohesion in the trans-European political 
community and support for integration. The model proposed here will also detail how identity 
cleavage (along a north-south dimension) in the political community is associated with support 
for integration. Without a political community, it may be difficult to see any significant degree of 
support for components of the political system, such as institutions or politicians (Easton 1965: 
189). Deutsch refers to a political community as a “people who have learned to communicate 
with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and 
service” (1953: 61). This definition captures the notion of a political community as the amount of 
cohesion among individual citizens; individuals are part of a defined community because they 
have developed a social-psychological attachment with one another through greater 
communication and understanding. What has often been referred to as a “we feeling” (Deutsch et 
al 1957: 36) has also been captured in other, more general, renditions of community (Taylor 
1972; Harrison 1974). In sum, a political community is “that aspect of a political system that 
consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of 
labor” (Easton 1965:  177). The emphasis is in individuals drawn together for the purpose of 
operating within a common structure.  
The ideas and practice of European unification is an example of political community 
building. Jean Monnet and others in the pan-European movement held a vision that is reflected in 
the preamble to the Treaty of Rome:  integration is a project establishing a polity with a common 
political structure. My central argument is that support for integration is associated with the   2
formation of a European political community. The foundation of this community is the 
development of positive images among fellow Europeans because such images broaden in-group 
membership. However images of individuals marked by a north-south identity will have different 
effects on support for European unification. The remaining sections will detail the importance of 
in-group membership for an individual’s motivation to support integration. I test the hypotheses 
using ordered logistic regression analysis using data from five Eurobarometer surveys conducted 
from 1980-1994 among the first 12 members.  
Self-interest, trust, and cooperation 
Easton’s (1965; 1975) theoretical work views public support as being either specific (also 
known as utilitarian support) or diffuse. This section differentiates the motivations of both types 
and concludes that given differing motivations, variables that explain one type of support may 
not be as powerful in explaining the other type. Specifically, motivations for utilitarian support 
are primarily self-interest in nature while diffuse stems from a common interest motivation. 
Individuals provide utilitarian support when the state provides acceptable outputs (which can be 
economic or non-economic gains for the individual); in so doing, the state maintains the system 
through citizen support (Easton 1965:  157). Utilitarian support is especially popular among 
researchers in the context of European integration. They build upon the conceptualization of self-
interest, which has long been the cornerstone of understanding political decisions (Olson 1965).
1 
Researchers point out that motivations for utilitarian support arise from evaluations of the EU’s 
ability to provide benefits and minimize any negative effects, including the changing role of the 
EU as integration evolves (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld and Wildgen’s (1976) work 
shows a connection between support levels in the four core countries of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early years of integration. The attempt at   3
explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively notes that the economic 
downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. Eichenberg and 
Dalton’s (1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various levels of influence 
on support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this method of analysis with 
analogous findings (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 1997). Moreover, others 
have taken a more direct approach and predicted the probability of their support given the 
individual’s socio-economic position in the economy and the expected effects of market 
integration (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and 
Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998). 
Other individual motivations, while being self-interest in nature, are not necessary 
economic. The founders of European integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic 
wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch et al 
1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans also supported integration, in its early 
years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing 
memory of war and the end of the Cold War, physical security is not as strong a factor in 
supporting integration as it once was (Gabel 1998). Other benefits include a more effective form 
of governance that is lacking at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and 
high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).  
These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow 
range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles and other 
factors that influence self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but these 
variables do not explain how psychological factors, such as in-group/out-group dynamics, would 
also influence support. Such dynamics would explain how Europeans’ views on fellow   4
nationalities in the EU relate to utilitarian support and can serve as a more stable explanation 
because it relies on deep-seated perceptions.  
Diffuse support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to 
accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging 
to their wants” (Easton 1965: 273; 1975: 444). Easton goes on to say that such support “is an 
attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As 
such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with 
outputs” (Easton 1965: 274). What “an attachment” refers to is not quite clear. Easton does 
mention that it is associated to a “sense of community” (1965: 325) but this concept also lacks 
specificity by leaving its definition as “the degree of solidarity” (1965: 184). In the simplest 
formulation, diffuse support occurs after a period of time when specific support is present 
(Easton 1965).
2 Diffuse support enters the picture when the political system has a “communal 
ideology” that promotes a common interest (Easton 1965:  333). However, common interest is 
not entirely separate from self-interest. It is possible for a collection of individuals to have 
similar interests; however the summation of these interests does not necessarily define a common 
interest. Common interests arise from a coordination of similar self-interests. This coordination 
is more likely at higher rates of political cohesion, as measured by trust in others. Common 
interest develops because there is a “sense of community” where individuals strongly identify 
with one another (Easton 1965:  326).  
Developing explanations for supporting integration by understanding the role of common 
interests are not new. One of the more cited sets of work in this area is the postmaterialist 
argument. Inglehart (1971; 1977a; 1977b) states that Europeans were socialized in an 
environment of high rates of economic growth. As a result individuals in the post-war era   5
developed a different set of values (different from prior generations) that are amiable toward the 
prospects of regional integration. These individuals personally identify with supranational 
institutions and thereby give the process their support. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel 
(1998) dispute this claim with empirical evidence. Their research finds little evidence for the 
relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. In fact, the little evidence that 
does exist indicates that postmaterialists are less likely to support integration. However, the 
problem is not in the value of the postmaterialist explanation, but what it was trying to explain. 
Researchers used the postmaterialist variable in order to explain utilitarian support. However, the 
postmaterialist argument is not suited to explain such a variable. Postmaterialism cannot tell us 
how postmaterialists or materialists reach their opinions (Rochon 1998). In fact, it may be 
possible for both value sets to favor regional integration but for different reasons. It is easy to see 
that materialists would be in favor if they believe that regional integration will provide material 
and physical security. One can assume that postmaterialists would be in favor if they believe that 
it is a means to solve trans-national problems (e.g. clean air, water, etc.). This tells us that we 
need to understand the dependent variable (the type of support) in order to develop explanations.  
A political cohesion model for EU support 
Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration 
has mainly focused on the factors that would impede the formation of the political community. 
They echo the claim by Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule because it adds 
legitimacy to those that govern by the governed. McLaren (2002) demonstrates that hostility 
towards other cultures effects attitudes towards the European Union. Carey (2002) also 
demonstrates that a strong national attachment lowers the probability that an individual will 
support regional integration. In addition, Van Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by   6
examining the role integration has in forming primary national allegiances. These researchers 
demonstrate that these attitudes pose a problem in developing a European identity and thereby 
lower the chances of supporting the EU. In developing a political cohesion model, I focus 
attention on individuals’ direct evaluations of members of the trans-European society.  
I link support for integration to individuals’ perceptions that integration is a group effort. 
This perception can have a positive effect on support and tied to the usual collective action 
problems. Support improves with higher levels of cohesion among individuals in a political 
community. Greater cohesion lowers the barriers to collective action that are needed to solve 
problems facing Europeans. Of course, the actual problems are specific to the year or decade.  
Political cohesion is closely associated with establishment of a common identity. Through 
a common identity, individuals can rationalize that individual problems are actually collective 
problems and that societies need to forge links, by way of integration, if they are to be solved. A 
common European identity is not necessarily associated with a foundational mythos, ethnic 
affiliation (Obradovic 1996), common language, or shared customs (Smith 1992), or any 
characteristic that we usually associate with national identities (Zetterholm 1994; Cederman 
1996; McKay 1996). However, it does have a similarity with national identities in that it is 
“imagined” and develops through the construction of a society (Anderson 1991). This notion of 
“imagined” speaks to the malleable nature of identity and is therefore a construction or 
adaptation to new political and/or economic realities rather than from biological or common 
blood rationalities. In its construction, individuals make choices as to who can and cannot belong 
to a specific identity. In fact, individuals may also choose to belong or not to belong given the 
characteristics of those who already claim the identity. This concept of in-group/out-group   7
identity (who is and is not a member of group) will be shown as being important in the social-
psychological dynamics within and among such groups in a political community.  
The construction of a European identity has been associated with a common belief in 
liberal-democratic values (Moravcsik 1993; Beetham and Lord 1998), which have been codified 
in the legal formation of European citizenship. However, the average EU citizen may not have 
this level of sophisticated understanding of identity given that they are not well informed 
(Anderson 1998). The more reasonable approach in explaining support for integration is through 
the psychology of common interest evaluations.  
Piaget (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part of normal human behavior. 
These attachments promote cohesion among group members and are associated with the social-
psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. Individuals become members 
of the in-group because the group fulfills some need (Terhune 1964; Winter 1973; Stogdill 1974; 
McClelland 1975; Bass 1981). At the level of national identity, individuals attach themselves 
because they see the nation as the embodiment of what is important (DeLamater et al. 1969). 
Also individuals will interact with individuals who are members of another group if the other 
group’s members share some commonality with in-group members (Brewer 1968). The members 
of both groups are more trusting of each other and thereby facilitating cooperation among 
members. One often cited definition of trust is “the probability of getting preferred outcomes 
without the group doing anything to bring them about” (Gamson 1968:  54). That is, group 
members will not need to monitor each other because there is confidence that interests are 
aligned. Putnam (1993) shows, in the Italian cases, that the level of trust one has for others 
produces effective institutional performance because of the higher probability of obtaining 
cooperation. It lowers the costs of association because of the perception that individuals will not   8
cheat or defect. In paraphrasing Wintrobe (1995:  46), trust yields a stream of future returns on 
exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior predictable and 
stable. Therefore, individuals may develop overlapping group memberships or an integrated 
identity when trust is present. When trust is not present, overlapping memberships do not occur 
and group status becomes exclusive.  
How is political cohesion, as measured by trust levels, associated with support for European 
unification? Why would the north-south cleavage partially explain the variation of these two types 
of support? Social identity theory provides a good framework in getting answers to these 
questions, namely the two phenomena of in-group bias and out-group bias. In-group bias is a social 
condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their in-group versus others who are not 
members (the out-group members) (Tajfel 1978). In early psychological experiments individuals 
tended to give more rewards and side with other members of their group because of their 
affiliation. These biases occurred even when test subjects were only recently informed that they 
belong to a particular group and had never met nor interacted with other in-group members (Tajfel 
1978; Turner 1978; Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Brewer and Kramer 1985; Messick and Mackie 
1989).  
The cause of this bias, as put forth by Tajfel (1981; 1982), is due to positive evaluations 
individuals have for members of their group. They join and are identified by such groups because, 
as stated above, the group symbolizes a set of values. By associating with similar-valued 
individuals, self-esteem improves because values are reinforced. This self-esteem further improves 
when individuals make favorable comparisons between the in-group and out-group. Not only are 
they part of a subjectively valued group, the in-group is also subjectively judged as better than the 
other out-groups. Therefore, by tying an individual’s social identity to the importance of the in-  9
group, group maintenance or cooperation for group survival becomes important. To this end, 
individuals will tend to give favorable biases to fellow group members.  
Out-group bias, however, is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of 
out-groups instead of members of their own in-group. Out-group bias occurs when the two groups 
under observation are self-determined to be of differing social status (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and 
Turner 1986). Individuals from the lower status group have negative evaluations of members of 
their group when compared to the higher status out-group. The negative evaluations stem simply 
from their lower status position and are tied to their self-esteem. The relative evaluations lead 
members of the lower status group to have positive evaluations of higher status members and 
thereby extend favoritism to them. This phenomenon occurs when the lower status group feels that 
the higher status group is legitimately in their position and that the status hierarchy is stable 
(neither group will change their status) (Turner 1978). However, the members of the higher status 
group will continue to exhibit in-group biases because they have positive evaluations of their 
members and negative evaluations of the members from the out-group. Again this stems simply 
from the differing social status of the groups (Turner 1978).  
Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is 
important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. This is important in the 
context of integration because the formation of a European identity is not theorized to replace 
national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch et al. 1957). This is where the concept of 
image becomes important. Kelman (1965:  24) states that image  
…refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system. 
The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers – the   10
individual’s conception of what this object is like. Image is an inferred construct, however, 
rather than a mere designation of the way the object is phenomenally experienced.  
Scott, more succinctly, defines “…an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the 
totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation” 
(1965:  72). In addition, such images are subjective (Kelman 1965:  27). Individuals can use 
images of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes for and positive or negative stereotypes of 
out-groups (Druckman et al. 1974; Hewstone 1986; Druckman 1994). A positive image therefore 
develops the likelihood that multiple identities form as members of in-groups view the values of 
out-group members as similar and therefore compatible. Groups can, by this mechanism, tie 
themselves together in a unifying identity, in one extreme, much like individuals do with one 
another in forming group attachments. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in part, because 
of emotional importance to the group’s symbolic values. If a subset of such values is present in 
other groups, then a broader identity will form without necessarily dissolving prior identities. The 
individuals in the broader group (one that includes two or more in-groups) can now operate with 
similar cohesiveness as the individual in-groups. However if such values are not present then the 
in-group and out-group biases will manifest leading to a lack of cohesiveness.  
In the context of Europe, individuals may support integration when they have a positive 
image of other EU nationalities. This positive image may result from evaluations of similarity on a 
number of issues and thus an individual will tend to view other nationalities as more in line with 
the in-group versus an exclusive out-group identity. While Europeans may see some difference in 
tastes, such as food, music, art, etc., such differences would only limit the possibility of replacing 
the national identities with a European one. Where there are similarities, a cohesive political   11
community can develop. Subjectively perceived dissimilar values would produce less trust and 
lowers the probability of supporting integration.  
Among the first 12 members of the EU,
3 individuals can subjectively perceive differences 
along a north-south divide. Images of southern nationalities as lesser developed economically due 
to holding dissimilar values are prevalent in the minds of some. The resulting image of a more 
economically developed north can point to significant differences among the peoples of Europe. 
The issue of development is an important aspect because the level of economic development is 
perceived as an outcome of commonalities specific to the northern and southern sub-regions. The 
cultural factor that influences social-psychological perceptions may well have its roots in the 
Protestant reformation. This, along with the 30 Years War and the resulting Treaty of Westphalia, 
established national cultures along a Catholic-Protestant divide.
4 While the religious roots of 
development can be debated and refuted, the idea of a cultural explanation for development may 
linger in the mind of the average European. Niedermayer (1995) has already observed that there is 
a variation in trust among the first twelve EU nationalities. On average, northern nationalities were 
given more trust than southerners. But what is not clear from his research is the distribution of trust 
level across northern and southern respondents. Also, this research does not link trust levels to 
support, but does make a case for looking at trust in community building. 
Using the logic of social identity theory in the context of EU, I propose to test the following 
hypotheses. First, there is a positive association between the overall level of trust for fellow EU 
nationalities and support for integration. This trust is assumed to reflect the positive image of the 
European nationalities in the mind of the respondent. Positive images reflect group overlaps and 
the associated biases. Second, there would be a larger impact of trust in northern nationalities than 
in southern ones on support. Given the lower economic development of the southern nationalities,   12
southerners would comprise the lower status group. This lower status would promote biases 
against southerners and wishing to exclude them from the broader European in-group. Lastly, the 
larger impact of trust in northern nationalities would be present among both northern and southern 
respondents. This again is due to the lower economic status of southerners and the associated in-
group bias among northerners and out-group bias among southerners. Given that the northerners 
would be in the higher status in-group, they would wish to exclude themselves from a community 
that requires inclusion of the lower status group.  
Data description and testing procedures 
The public opinion data come from multiple Eurobarometer surveys (1980, 1986, 1990, 
1993, and 1994).
5 As with most studies using secondary data, great efforts were taken to 
optimize the operationalization of the variables by following the suggestions made by Kiecolt 
and Nathan (1985). Special attention was given in selecting specific surveys so that the questions 
offered sound measures for the variables. Since all the relevant questions were not asked after 
1994, the analysis includes only samples from the first twelve members of the EU. Some of the 
samples were collapsed while others were not included:  The Northern Ireland sample was 
included in the British sample and the East German sample was omitted given its unique 
attributes.
6 I use a weighted variable so that no national population will be over or under 
represented in the data (the European weight) because all tests are at the individual level.
7 This 
variable also adjusts for any over or under representation of socio-economic groups.  
OLS regression techniques are not permissible because the dependent variable is ordinal. 
Because it is not continuous, applying OLS techniques will produce inefficient coefficients that 
may lead to type one and two errors. The appropriate technique is to employ ordered regression 
models, specifically, an ordered logit model (Long 1997). Each model will be evaluated based   13
upon its significance of explanation. The evaluations of the coefficients will be solely based on 
their statistical significance and direction of signs. The independent variables will then be judged 
based upon their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variable’s values.  
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is support for European unification. The question is a trend 
question and normally appears in every Eurobarometer survey: 
In General are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?  
1.  For very much    2.  For to some extent 
3.  Against to some extent  4.  Against very much. 
 
In the post 1990 surveys, the phrase “Western Europe” was replaced by “Europe.” The responses 
for this question were recoded so that larger values measure higher levels of support. 
Independent variables 
The following are the explanatory variables, each of which measures the respondent’s trust 
in fellow EU nationalities. The operationalization of the trust variable is through a series of 
questions asking the respondents to gauge their trust in EU nationalities:  
I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various 
countries.  For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very 
much trust, or no trust at all?   
1.  Lot of Trust     2.  Some Trust  
3.  Not Very Much Trust   4.  No Trust at All. 
 
The respondents go through and assign a level of trust to each nationality including their own.
8 
This variable therefore measures both trans-national trust levels as well as intra-national trust 
levels. Since trans-national trust is the variable of importance in this research (the trust one has 
for fellow Europeans that are not members of the respondents’ nationality), I coded intra-national 
trust as missing. The values were also recoded so that larger values correspond to higher levels   14
of trust. A confirmatory factor analysis will be performed to see if the 12 individual variables do 
in fact group along northern and southern dimensions.   
Control variables
9 
The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the 
light of some prevailing hypotheses. 
Utilitarian support. Easton (1965) noted theoretically that individuals give diffuse support 
after they have given specific (utilitarian) support. Therefore utilitarian support partially explains 
diffuse support. Since the dependent variable captures can capture the concept of diffuse support, 
a variable measuring utilitarian support is therefore need. Gabel (1998) suggests the following 
question: 
Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European 
Community [European Union] is a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor 
bad? 
1. Good Thing  2. Bad Thing  3. Neither Good nor Bad 
 
The responses for this question were recoded so that “good thing” has a value of 3, “bad 
thing” has a value of 1, and “neither good nor bad” has a value of 2. 
Education. To measure this variable, I use a standard question found in all Eurobarometer 
surveys since 1970:  How old were you when you stopped full-time education? The responses are 
then collapsed into 9 groups:  values from 1 to 8 begin with the age of 14 and end with the age of 
21, with the value 9 assigned to those who finished after the age of 22. Individuals who are still 
studying are recoded into their appropriate age group based on their response to the question 
requesting their age. Although they have not completed their studies, this method captures the 
height of their educational status at the time survey.  
Democratic Deficit. The democratic deficit is a widely talked about problem in EU politics 
(McCormick 1999; Schmitter 2000). The magnitude of the problem can be seen in the large   15
public protests outside Council and IGC meetings. Rohrschneider’s (2002) analysis indicates that 
there is a positive relationship between being satisfied with EU level democracy and support for 
integration. Unfortunately, the question measuring satisfaction with EU level democracy was 
asked in only two of the five surveys used in this analysis (1993 and 1994). To include this 
variable would therefore drop the number of observation years and potentially including a bias in 
the results. Instead I employ the following question which captures the degree to which 
individuals are satisfied with democracy in their country: 
On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?   
1.   Very satisfied    2.  Fairly satisfied 
3.  Not very satisfied  4.  Not at all satisfied. 
I justify using this variable as a proxy for satisfaction with EU level democracy due to the 
high correlation (gamma=0.46). This indicates that the two variables are actually measuring 
overall satisfaction with democracy. The variable was recoded so that larger numbers represent 
satisfaction with democracy.  
Income. Respondents were asked to choose an income range that would include their 
annual household income (13 standardized levels). No specific hypothesis is developed here with 
regard to this variable’s contribution to explaining support for integration. 
Ideology. Prior research demonstrates the negative association nationalism has on both 
identity formation and support (McLaren 2002; Carey 2003). One method to measure this 
possible effect is through left-right self-evaluations.
10 The respondents were asked to place 
themselves on a left-right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme 
rightist ideology. I hypothesize that the higher values of this variable will be negatively 
associated with support for integration for reasons given in McLaren (2002) and Carey (2003).    16
Country and year effects. Country and year dummies are included in each of the models but 
the results are not reported due to space constraints. These dummy variables control for effects 
that are specific to either the countries in the analysis or the year of the surveys. In each 
regression one country dummy variable is omitted and the base year is 1980.  
Explaining support for the EU 
The overall results of the analysis show that political cohesion is an important factor in 
explaining support for the EU. The first step was to determine if the trust variables measured the 
latent dimensions described in the theoretical section. I hypothesized that trust in the EU-12 
nationalities measures political cohesiveness. However, this trust is thought to be divided along a 
north-south dimension. The confirmatory factor analysis using the maximum likelihood method 
(varimax rotation) presented in table one indicates that two factors do indeed underlie the trust 
variables.
11 Trust in the northern nationalities group together in one factor loading while trust in 
the southern nationalities fall into another. This indicates that evaluations of these two groups 
take on different dimensions. The variables that measure trust in the northern nationalities were 
summed together and divided by seven or six to produce one variable. The variables that 
measure trust in the southern nationalities were summed together and divided by five or four to 
produce a second variable.
12 By dividing the additive term by the appropriate number, the range 
of the variable is restricted to between one and four, thereby allowing comparability when 
interpreting results. The reliability coefficients for both indexed variables are quite high (α=0.85 
for the northern trust variable and α =0.79 for the southern trust variable), indicating a very good 
fit among the variable components (DeVellis 1991).  
Table two presents the first results of the ordered logit regression with support as the 
dependent variable. Each of the two models is significant as shown by their respective chi-  17
squares. Model one tests the relationship between trust for all EU-12 nationalities and support. 
The sign of the coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that the more an individual trusts 
members of other EU nationalities, the higher levels of support. This result holds even while 
controlling for the other variables. The second column in table two shows the marginal changes 
in the predicted probabilities of respondents stating that they are “very much for” European 
unification. Each value indicates the marginal change in this probability associated with the 
independent variable as it moves from its minimum to its maximum value while holding the 
other variables constant at their means. Respondents are about 27.4 percentage points more 
likely to strongly support unification as we move from the lowest to the highest level of trust in 
fellow EU nationalities. The EU-12 trust variable has a larger marginal change than any of the 
control variables save utilitarian support.  
Model two in table two substitutes the EU-12 trust variable with those that measure trust in 
the northern and southern nationalities. The results fall along expected lines. Both variables are 
positive but trust in northern nationalities has a higher level of statistical significance. The 
coefficient for the northern trust variable is larger than the southern variable. The difference is 
statistically significant (p = .0000). As individuals’ trust in northern nationalities moves from the 
minimum value to the maximum value, we see a 24.4 percentage point increase in the probability 
that they will be very much for unification. The same change in the values for trust in southern 
nationalities produces an approximate 3.1 percentage point increase. In total, the results indicate 
the greater importance of trusting northern nationalities vis-à-vis southern nationalities in 
predicting the probabilities that individuals will say that they are for unification.  
For the final steps of the analysis, I break the data down into northern and southern 
respondents and reexamine model two of table two. In this analysis the nation weight was   18
employed instead of the European weight because the analysis examines individuals from 
specific member countries. Table three displays the results of the reexamination. The values 
represent the probability that respondents would state that they are “against very much,” “against 
to some extent,” “for to some extent,” or “for very much.” The rows labeled “Trust in northern 
nationalities” have the northern trust variable set at the highest level, the southern trust variable 
set at the lowest level, and the remaining variables set at their means. The opposite is true for the 
row labeled “Trust in southern nationalities.”  
The first entries in table three are for the southern respondents. The results indicate that 
trust in northerners and southerners are of unequal value among the southern respondents when 
trying to predict the varying levels of support for unification. Southern respondents who highly 
trust northerners are 52.8 percent likely to be strongly supportive of unification. These same 
respondents are 19.7 percent likely to make the same statement at the highest level of trust for 
southerners. The second sets of entries are for northern respondents and tell a similar story. 
Those that highly trust southerners have a 13.8 percent likelihood of strongly favoring European 
unification, but those that highly trust northerners have a 30.3 percent likelihood. Trusting people 
of northern nationalities has a larger impact on supporting unification than trusting southerners.  
Conclusion 
The political cohesion model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting 
the EU. Greater levels of trust among individuals are significantly associated with higher 
probabilities of supporting integration. Given the lower level of economic development among 
the southern countries, individuals that trust these nationalities are less likely to see the common 
interests involved in building an untied Europe. In short, the north-south demarcation is 
significant for Europeans when supporting integration.    19
Two important items must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these items 
would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important enough to 
consider. First, given that the surveys used in this analysis are old, we would need to obtain up-
to-date data that indicates that the association between trust among Europeans support has not 
changed. However, there is nothing in the model’s logic that makes the arguments any less 
salient today. Also, year dummy variables were not significantly different from the base year, 
which indicates that there is a lack of temporal influence. However, more current data is an 
important way to determine if the findings of the 1980s and 1990s hold today.  
Second, Europe has expanded further eastward. This fact may not necessarily add 
complexity to model. Since trust in northern nationalities proved to be more important than trust 
in southern nationalities, it may be true that trust for the eastern nationalities may prove to be less 
important as well. If economic development is the key factor in understanding why trust in 
northern nationalities is more important, then trusting eastern nationalities may prove to be an 
even less important factor due to their lesser developed economic status vis-à-vis the southern 
periphery.    20
Table 1 
 
Maximum likelihood factor analysis for trust in EU nationalities (varimax rotation) 
 
Trust in:  Factor loading  Factor loading 
  
Luxembourgers  .799 .214 
Dutch  .791 .206 
Danes  .776 .205 
Belgians  .771 .258 
British  .536 .259 
Irish  .529 .384 
Germans  .490 .236 
  
Spanish .237 .740 
Portuguese .282 .675 
Greeks .197 .658 
Italians .289 .600 
French .415 .458 
  
χ
2 = 10362.02; df = 43; p < .000   
  
Trust in northern nationalities reliability α = .85     
Trust in southern nationalities reliability α = .79     
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Table 2 
 
Ordered logit model:   
Support for European unification on trust for Europeans among the first 12 members 
 
Independent variables  Model 1  Marginal 
Changes in 
Probabilities
1 
Model 2  Marginal 
Changes in 
Probabilities
1 
Trust variables         
Trust in all EU-12 
nationalities 
.503***
(.026)
.274  
-- 
 
-- 
Trust in northern 
nationalities 
 
-- 
 
-- 
.450*** 
(.029) 
.244
Trust in southern 
nationalities 
 
-- 
 
-- 
.053* 
(.026) 
.031
Control variables   
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
.176***
(.018)
.104 .169*** 
(.017) 
.101
Left/Right self 
placement 
.003
(.006)
.006 .008 
(.006) 
.015
Europe good/bad  1.48***
(.024)
.378 1.50*** 
(.023) 
.388
Demographic variables   
Education .027***
(.005)
.043 .026*** 
(.005) 
.042
Income .021***
(.004)
.046 .020*** 
(.004) 
.044
τ
1 1.86 2.01 
τ
2 3.60 3.74 
τ
3 6.71 6.83 
χ
2 (degrees of freedom)  7492.5(20)*** 7787.0(22)*** 
log likelihood  -21169.4 -21710.7 
N 22,936 22,936 
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses;  
***p ≤ .000; **p ≤ .010; *p ≤ .050;  
Survey Years: 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, and 1994.  
1Ordinal value of “For very much”   22
Table 3 
 
Ordered logit model:  Predicted probabilities for support for European unification on trust for 
Europeans among southern and northern respondents
1 
        
Southern respondents  Against  Against to some extent  For some extent  For 
Trust in northern nationalities  .007  .031  .434  .528 
Trust in southern nationalities  .033  .120  .650  .197 
      
Northern respondents  Against  Against to some extent  For some extent  For 
Trust in northern nationalities  .025  .094  .579  .303 
Trust in southern nationalities  .065  .202  .595  .138 
1Southern respondents = French, Italian, Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese 
Northern respondents = Belgium, Dutch, German, Luxembourgers, Danes, Irish, and British 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1The utilitarian support approach also stems from the endogenous political economy literature, 
which approaches the study of integration through a rational framework. It is closely related to 
other works that explain the behavior of domestic forces by looking at group motivations and 
their impact on national government decision (Downs 1957; Gamson 1961; Ames 1987; Levi 
1988; Geddes 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). The primary motivation of the political elite 
is either to remain in power or to allow a particular political party to remain in power. Therefore 
the politician will form coalitions among societal groups for this end. The wishes of the 
domestic forces need to be satisfied before the next turn in the election cycle occurs. 
Endogenous economic theory applies this logic to nation-state policy formulation regarding the 
global economy. Individuals form coalitions depending on their role in the economy (Stopler 
and Samuelson 1941). Such roles are economic factors (Rogowski 1989), economic sectors 
(Gourevitch 1986), or sectors that have specific assets (Frieden 1991). Each group will make 
their economic cost-benefit calculations and support foreign economic policies on this basis.  
2 See Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981) for the evidence of this process in the case of post-
war Germany. 
3 Due to data limitations, the hypotheses will only focus on the first twelve members of the EU.  
4 While Greece is neither Catholic nor Protestant, it will be grouped together with the former.  
5 The survey responses fall under the category of a repeated cross-sectional data set. Given the 
fact that no panel data are present (because different individuals are surveyed over the time 
frame) it would be inappropriate to consider the data as time series cross-sectional (Beck and 
Katz 1995). Therefore time series techniques and diagnostics would be inappropriate.   31
                                                                                                                                                             
6 The East German sample may exhibit questionable results given its early phase of democratic 
transition and its recent membership, which may distort findings. One such fear is an inaccuracy 
of questionnaire responses due to the public’s long legacy of authoritarianism. 
7 The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers 
believe that aggregation of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random “noise” 
from the measurements (Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), 
research shows that the error associated with individual level variation may be systemic (Duch, 
Palmer, and Anderson 2000). Therefore aggregating the data would not remove any associated 
“noise,” but instead may harm the robustness of potential results due to a lower number of 
observations.  
8 This is contrary to what is stated in the Eurobarometer codebooks. The codebooks state that 
individuals are not asked to rate trust for their fellow nationals. However a look at the data 
clearly shows that this is not the case. Researchers should pay close attention before using this 
variable. 
9 Every attempt was made to include controls for alternative explanations. However since this 
analysis includes five time points, some questions that may prove interesting were not included 
in all the questionnaires. This included the battery of questions that tapped into postmaterialist 
values and cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 1977b; 1990). Since no reliable proxy is available, 
these variables were omitted. Finally, age was omitted since it is associated with the education 
control variable.  
10 McLaren (2002) and Carey (2003) used survey questions that directly measured nationalism. I 
use the left-right self-evaluations as a proxy given that the surveys used in this paper did not 
have direct measures.   32
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Unrotated confirmatory factor analysis and exploratory factor analysis produced similar 
results.  
12 Recall that the respondent will only evaluate the trustworthiness of nationalities excluding her 
or his own. Therefore the scale is divided by (n-1) when that respondent’s nationality is in the 
scale.  